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"Hereupon is to be collected divers diversities.:" These related, in the original
text, to the feudal law of land. "Apt words of limitation are quamdiu, dummodo,
dum, quousque, durante &c..... 2 However apt these words may have been, they

seem out of fashion today. Similar changes have occurred in class shareholder
rights, and the old words of "vested rights" now seem equally out of fashion. Such
rights are now "fixed" only in the sense that they continue until changed by the
vote of a specified majority in the manner provided by statute.
Throughout the nineteenth century, land remained the principal form of property.
It was natural, therefore, for judges, being students of tradition and for the most
part freeholders as well, to approach new forms of property with a solid respect for
the principles of real estate law. This was no less true where the issue involved
a group of people, as when Leicester Square was set apart by its owner as a "square
garden" for the use of all those to whom he sold nearby lots? They were still a
small group, and their interests were intensely tangible and personal. It was natural,
therefore, as in the case of partnerships, for the courts to require unanimous consent
for any substantial change of specified participations.
Corporation law in the modern sense was unknown, apart from limited exceptions
in New York, until about I835 .' From then on, general acts were adopted with
increasing frequency to permit incorporation through standardized procedure without need of special legislative act. By the middle of the century, this had become
the customary method of incorporation. But the corporation was still viewed as
a mere legal form attributed to a group of individuals, usually a limited group, for
the promotion of some particular enterprise. The enterprise itself was limited and
not so very different from a "square garden" or.a partnership. Indeed, the law was
clearly concerned with imposing effective limits on the scope and duration of the
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undertaking.5 A definite time limit was usually imposed on the continuation of
the corporate existence. The powers that might be exercised were sparingly enumerated, rather than by general grant. The incorporators or directors were often required to be residents of the domiciliary state. There was no power to hold stock
in other corporations. And all of these limitations were enforced with a strict eye.
This may reflect an uneasy recollection of the vast holdings of property by the
Church in England, and, indeed, in all of Europe, until the sixteenth century. But
in any event, the policy of restraint is clear.
If we say that America's greatest need at the end of the eighteenth century was
political independence from Europe, we may equally agree that her greatest need in
the second half of the nineteenth century was the multiplication of property. New
means were provided by the techniques of the industrial revolution. New necessities
were presented in the subjugation of the continental wilderness, which was a supreme
opportunity and challenge. Throughout this period, accordingly, and for another
third of a century as well, the aspects of property received special veneration. The
social need combined with feudal tradition for this result. The astonishing advances in material prosperity that ensued made it easy to accept the supremacy of
property as a natural and sufficient postulate.
This postulate received some of its most striking illustrations in court decisions
on attempts to amend corporate charters. Rules of feudal rigidity were built
up on the basis of a prior decision that had been rendered in a different context
with regard to Dartmouth College.6
Before the days of the American business corporation, the Supreme Court had
been faced by an attempted appropriation of an institution established in corporate
form by royal charter. The Trustees of Dartmouth College were entitled by charter
to appoint their own successors in perpetuity. On this basis, considerable sums had
been bequeathed them by Lord Dartmouth for the "education of the American
savages." After the Revolution, it occurred to New Hampshire that a more agreeable scheme would be for all the Trustees to be appointed by the Governor. So, it
adopted an act purporting to amend the charter to this effect. This attempt to
"nationalize" the control of Dartmouth was, in some respects, similar to the
Egyptian expropriation of the Suez Canal. The change, intensely simple, was one
by which "the will of the state is substituted for the will of the donors, in every
essential operation," and, in consequence, the "system is totally changed" so as to be
"subversive of that contract" 7 The Supreme Court held this invalid under the
Federal Constitution
No such difficulties would exist, Mr. Justice Story added
in his concurring opinion, if "a power be reserved for this purpose" of later amend
'See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
'Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (i8x9).
7Id. at 652-53.
' This was under the contracts clause, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § io, ci. i, but the same result was later
reached under the due process clause. Id., amend. XIV, § x. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522, 526
(i898) (dictum). But see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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ment This cue was immediately followed by many states, and such reservations
of power became customary.
As a simple matter of common sense, one would have supposed that the reservation of unlimited power of amendment of corporate charters would have made, as
it was no doubt intended to do, the Dartmouth College case wholly inapplicable in
subsequent corporation law. But judges seek what they think the country needsmost. With feudal recollections and guided by the dominant role of property in
augmenting the American empire at that time, the judges set about to find "divers
diversities" that might limit and defeat the reserved power of amendment. First,
they extended the underlying premise of the Dartmouth College case. As decided,
it did not involve a change by majority vote of the owners. Rather, it involved
a state seizure of control of a private institution and its property. For all that, it
was now extended so that, as in the case of realty and partnerships, the shareholder's
interest, however defined in the charter, was constitutionally immune from any
substantial change, except by his individual consent.
This made it necessary to inquire whether there had been "consent" in each
particular case. The concept of consent comes from the law of private contracts.
It is not an altogether easy matter to determine when there has been a meeting of
minds between two men. It is decidedly more complicated to determine when
there has been a meeting of minds between an individual investor and the sovereign,
who can be found only in shifting groups of spokesmen and often enough expresses
his will in Delphic phrases that become precise only with the slow elucidation of
experience. But it is natural to deal with a new problem in terms of accepted
tradition. There could be little doubt that consent is given if the power to amend
on the assent of a stipulated majority was proclaimed in terms in the charter. If
a purchaser assents to anything, he assents to that.0 But there should be no more
doubt where the right is reserved in the code or constitution of the domiciliary state.
While these are more difficult to locate and often to understand, it is elemental that
the law of the state at the time of issuing the charter is a part of the charter as fully
as if printed in the text of the charter itself." It would seem to follow, therefore,
as the modern cases hold, that there can be no impairment of contracts, and no
2
taking of property, where the right to make the amendment is reserved by law.'
But for a long time, it was not so simple. The elaboration of the "consent"
doctrine led to many scholarly "diversities." One line of cases held that the power
57 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 675.
X
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722 (1949).
1
" De Mello v. Dairyman's Co-Operative Creamery, 73 Cal. App. 2d 746, 167 P.2d 226 (1946);

10

Bcloff v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 3oo N.Y. I1, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); Franzblau v. Capital
Securities Co. 2 N.J. Super. 517, 64 A.2d 644 (Ch. 1949); Sherman v. Pepin Pickling Co., 23o Minn.
87, 41 N.W.2d 571 (195o); Midland Truck Lines, Inc. v. Atwood, 362 Mo. 397, 24X S.W.2d 903, 904-05
(1951); Opdyke v. Security Savings & Loan Co., 157 Ohio St. 121, 105 N.E.2d 9 (x952); ris re
Mayellen Apartments, 134 Cal. App. 2d 298, 285 P.2d 943 (1955).
2
" McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. r945); Donohue v. Heuser,
239 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Ky. 1951).
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of amendment reserved by statute should be so narrowly read as to include only
those aspects of the corporate charter affecting relations with the state and, thus, to
have no bearing at all on any proposed change of the class shareholder rights.'8 As
far as corporate readjustments were concerned, the result was the same as if there
had been no reserved power at all and hence no "consent." A second line of cases
held that even if the legislative authorization for charter changes dealt unmistakably
with changes of class right, still it would not be applied to any particular change
unless that particular change was itemized specifically in the statute. If some other
name could be found for the change, as the resources of the bar and bench ordinarily
permit, it was held beyond the reserved power. It was quite plain that when the
judges considered property rights to be in risk, they would not listen to the legislature
if they could find any way to avoid it. And, of course, they generally could.
For example, although the Delaware legislature reserved the power for any alteration of "preference" upon a majority assent of the adversely-affected class, the Delaware courts held that accrued dividends of preferred stock were a "vested right"
rather than a "preference" and, thus, beyond the scope of the reserved power 4 A
third line of cases held that even if the reserved power was unmistakably clear and
unassailably specific, nevertheless, it would not be applied to stock issued prior to
the enactment of the statute.'
The flood tide of this judicial preoccupation with the fixed rights of private
property, as well as its turn and ebb, can be found in the treatment given the Delaware legislation of 1927 broadening its amendment statute to include all "special
rights" as well as "preferential rights." This was generally understood to permit
the elimination of preferred arrears1 0 Many transactions were accomplished on
that premise. But then the Delaware Supreme Court unexpectedly held the new
words inapplicable to previously-issued stock 1 The "vested rights" doctrine, however, had outlived its usefulness. Soon afterwards, the Delaware court found a way
to permit changes to be made without regard to the calendar. It would uphold
them so long as they were accomplished
through the formal variant of a merger,
8
even with a wholly owned subsidiary.'
In retrospect, it is now apparent that this marked the end of "vested rights,"
"sFor this result, a philosophy was presupposed by which a corporate charter is simultaneously three
contracts: (i) a contract among the shareholders, (2) a contract between the shareholders and the
corporation, and (3) a contract between the corporation and the state. See, e.g., Pronik v. Spirits Distributing Co., 58 N.J. Eq. 97, 42 Ad. 586 (Ch. 1899). State reservation statutes have all been interpreted as applying to corporate charters in so far as they are contracts between the corporation and
the state.
"' Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. x36, 122 At. 696 (Ch. 1923).
5
" E.g., Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533 (D. R.I. X929).
"oSee Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. x933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 673

(1933).

"8 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 2i Del. Ch. 391, x9o At. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
" Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Porges v.

Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Ch. 1943). And see Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2o9 (D. Del. 1946), afl'd, x63 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1947); Hottenstein v. York Ice
Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3 d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945).
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though the tide did not turn instantaneously and equally in all places.' 9 If particular
aspects of a shareholder's interest were constitutionally immune from any substantial
change, except on his consent, which is the "vested rights" doctrine, they would be
no more subject to change by mere difference in technical procedure, whether or not
accompanied by a cash-appraisal right. He would be constitutionally entitled to
keep what he had and could not be forced to give it up for another form of
property corresponding in another person's judgment to the value of what he
liked. Logically, he could no more be forced to exchange his interests for cash
than he could be forced to exchange them for stock. So when it was held constitutional to force an unwilling shareholder to accept money in a merger, it was only
a question of time before logic and common sense would sweep away purely formal
distinctions and, thus, eliminate what still remained of "vested rights."
The real determinants of the courts' new approach to changes in the corporate
structure are not, however, to be found in the rationale of the early cases. The
reasoning of Havender ° was as technical as Keller.2 ' But technicalities can be a
workmanlike device for opening a passage when that is being done for the first time.
After Havender, we cannot doubt that the door was opened to remain open. The
courts, at last, had recognized that a new world had grown up outside the courtrooms that could no longer be measured in the old Euclidian terms. The new
spaces of the industrial world, like those of the physical, required a new philosophical
formulation. Relativity was as applicable to one as to the other.
Instead of a neighborhood railroad which could not be extended except on
unanimous consent,2 2 the new systems ran from the Atlantic to the Mississippi.or
thence to the Pacific, often with bus and air subsidiaries. The neighborhood power
house had become an electric utility system serving a connected territory in several
states. The neighborhood flour or textile mill had become a vast organization owning
its sources of raw material throughout the world, manufacturing wherever economy
indicated, and selling in the national market and beyond.
The statistical measure of these changes, ideally, would be a cumulative summary
of the family corporations of fifty years ago, for example, that are now owned by
the public, contrasting their assets, earnings, and number of stockholders at that
earlier time with the present. But those figures are inaccessible. The pace of change
can be illustrated, however, in other ways. The number of companies with securities
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, which presupposes public distribution, has
substantially tripled since the end of I9M3, increasing from an estimated 350 at that
time to 11o5 on August 3, 1957. During this period, the number of listed shares
increased from 151,000,000 at the end of 1913, to 8o8,oooooo at the beginning of 1929,
and thence to 4,719,000,000 on August 3, 1957. Between the last two dates, their
"' A more detailed analysis of the judicial decisions is made in Gibson, The Virginia CorporationLaw
of 1956, 42 VA. L. REWV
445, 603, 6o6-o8 (1956).
20 Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 3x8, ii A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
21

Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, igo Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936).

"See Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R.R., i8 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867).
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aggregate market value increased from $7,ooooooooo to $218,ooooooooo. This is
undeniably an important segment of the economy. Particularizing, we can take the
twenty American corporations that are most widely owned by the public today and
trace their growth since 1913 in the following tables.
TABLE A
TOTAL ASSETS PER BOOKS

(in millions)
Company

19 13 21

19292

195725

American Tel. & Tel................
General Motors .....................
Standard Oil (N. J.) .................
General Electric .....................
Ford Motor ........................
United States Steel ..................
Socony Mobil Oil ...................
Cities Service .......................
Radio Corp .........................
DuPont ............................
Pennsylvania R. R ...................
Standard Oil (Ind.) ..................
Commonwealth Edison ...............
Consolidated Edison (N. Y.) ..........
Westinghouse Electric ...............
Public Service Electric & Gas .........
Standard Oil (Calif.) .................
Pacific Gas & Electric ...............
Texas Co ...........................
Southern Co .........................

$ 656
58
a
144
a
1,800
94
b
b
74
940
49
88
164
83
c
88
204
68
c

$4,228
1,325
1,767
492
a
2,286
815
1,090
117
542
2,078
697
376
699
254
c
605
454
527
c

$17,678
6,826
8,712
2,361
3,114
4,074
3,105 d
1,279
721
3,552
2,991
2,535
1,460
1,829
1,401
1,061
2,246
2,146
2,729
1,037

Key: a-not published
b-company not in existence
c-not separately available because part oi a holding company system
d-reflects divestment of utility properties

The revenues collected are a more realistic measure of their participation in the
economy.
This is a different world, indeed. To look only at the first two, a service enterprise that'was being paid by the economy in the order of $2i5,ooo,ooo in 1913 (and

paying out correspondingly for labor, capital, plant) had grown to a $I,ooo,ooo,ooosize in 1929 and has grown beyond the $5,ooooooooo-size today; and a manufacturing
enterprise, merely a starter in 19o7, exceeded $i,ooooooooo in 1929 and exceeds
$io,ooo,ooo,ooo today.
The number of shareholders in these same corporations reveals in another way
how far they have moved from the relationship of neighbors or partners.
"' POOR's MANUAL OF INDUSIRIALs (1914); POOR'S MANUAL OF PUBLIC UnLInEs (1914).
"'MooDY's INDUSTRIALS (933); MooDY's PUBLIC UrLITrEs (933); MOODY'S RAiLROADs (2930).
" MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS (1958); MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITES (1958); MOODY's RAILROADS

(1958).
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TABLE B
GRoss REvENuEs

(in millions)
Company

191326

192927

195728

American Tel. & Tel .................
General Motors .....................
Standard Oil (N. J.) .................
General Electric .....................
Ford M otor ........................
United States Steel ..................
Socony Mobil Oil ...................
Cities Service .......................
Radio Corp.........................
DuPont ............................
Pennsylvania R. R ...................
Standard Oil (Ind.) ..................
Commonwealth Edison ..............
Consolidated Edison (N. Y.) ..........
Westinghouse Electric ...............
Public Service Electric & Gas .........
Standard Oil (Calif.) .................
Pacific Gas & Electric ................
Texas Co ...........................
Southern Co ........................

$215
[810
a
106
a
796
[161e
b
b
27
185
a
17
14
40
c
[19]e
16
26
c

$1,071
1,504
1,523
415
a
1,494
[641e
184
159
82
182
[85]e
83
223
216
c
70
64
213
c

$ 6,313
11,085
7,830
4,336
5,771
4,414
2,976
1,046d
1,176
2,000
987
2,010
380
553
2,009
322
1,651
501
2,344
255

Key: a-not published
b-company not in existence
c-not separately available because part of a holding company system
d-reflects divestment of utility properties
e-after expenses

TABLE C
NUmMER OF SEHAROLDERS'

Company

1957

American Tel. & Tel .......................
General M otors ...........................
Standard Oil (N. J.) .......................
General Electric ...........................
Ford Motor ...............................
United States Steel ........................
Socony M obil Oil ..........................
Cities Service Co ..........................
Radio Corp ...............................
DuPont ..................................
Pennsylvania R. R .........................
Standard Oil (Ind.) ........................

1,490,000
640,473
403,000
366,524
298,918
257,997
181,605
174,496
158,397
153,832
144,468
143,225

20 PooR's MANUAL OF INDUSTRIALS (1914); POOR's MANUAL OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (914).

2 MooDY'S INDUSTRIALS (933); MooDy's PUBLIC UTILITIES (1933); MOODY's RAILROADS (930).
"SMooDY's INDUSRIAS (1958); MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITIES (31958); MOODY'S RAILROADS (1958).

" The Exchange (published by New York Stock Exchange), March 1957, P. 7.
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Commonwealth Edison .....................

143,009

Consolidated Edison (N. Y.) ................
Westinghouse Electric ......................
Public Service Electric & Gas ...............
Standard Oil (Calif.) .......................
Pacific Gas & Electric ......................
Texas Co .................................
Southern Co ..............................

142,623
139,201
137,404
137,381
135,454
131,035
121,954

At the present time, 8,6ooooo people own shares in American business corporations.0 This represents a thirty-three per cent increase in the four years from
1952 to 1956.31

Over two-thirds of these holders have incomes of less than $7,5oo

a year. And the end is not yet. It has been estimated that during the decade ending
in 1965, an increase of roughly forty per cent will be realized in each of gross national
product, public construction, disposable income, and consumer expenditures. 82 This
will require large increases in the physical plant of the economy. It will also require
large-scale financing. It is estimated that during the decade ending in 1965, American
business corporations will need to raise "$o billions in outside equity money" for
the enlargement of their plant and equipment, or three times the volume of new
stock financing in the last ten years a3 Financing of this extent will require resort
to the American people for additions to their individual investments.
These developments are propelled by the "deepest force of the time," which is
the aspiration of the masses of the people for increased participation in the new
products made available by science 3 4 This necessitates production and distribution
in the largest volume. This has been possible only though the astonishing growth
of the American business corporation. It has grown in size, spread throughout the
United States, overrun its political boundaries, and enlisted the investments of
increasing millions of citizens. It continues to grow by its own concentration of
ability and method. Thus, it has become a "political institution,'..' "a quasi-governing
agency." '
It is now a participant in the administration of affairs in a degree
of importance having both national and international interest. This diversification
of activity is essential not only to business, but also to government itself, since no
modern state can hope to defend itself within the resources of its own political
7
frontiers?
In such a perspective, the old reasoning of private contract law has lost its savor,
just as the feudal words "quamdiu, .... dummodo," etc. seem out of fashion now.
3o NEw Yonu
33

STOCK EXCHANGE, WHO OwNs AmRmucAN BUSINESS?.

2-3 (x956).

Id. at 5.
Projection by the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, charted in PooR's

INvEs-MENT

AD-

-SORYSURvEY 274 (1957).

"Address by G. Keith Funston, New Steps to Strengthen the Rights of Stockholders, General
Management Conference of the American Management Association, June 4, 1957.
"AoLPH A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPiTALiST REVOLUION
164 (1954).
"Id. at 6o.
Ibid.
"See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., TirEs oF CISIs x6-17 (1957).
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As a corporation loses its neighborhood aspect and takes on the character of apolitical institution, it is of national concern that the corporation have flexibility
to adapt itself to new challenges and new problems arising in our ever-changing
economy. It becomes necessary that rearrangement of its capitalization with the
shifting tides of business need should be accomplished like other practical decisions.
This means that changes can be made by the majority within the procedural limitations set up by statute to safeguard the minority from abuse. No veto by a small
group can be tolerated. However suitable the rule of unanimity might be for apartnership, it is wholly unsuited to political institutions08
In formal terms, this means the disappearance of the doctrine of "vested rights."
And now, where a statute authorizes change, no limit is to be drawn on the power
of the corporation to make changes of any nature and extent in the rights of shareholders, so long as the requisite proportion of the affected class assent. Conversely,
modifications of class-shareholder rights will present no justiciable question, except
where noncompliance with the statute or fraud is alleged. This is on the simple
ground that if the amendment is authorized by statute, the legislature has spoken
and judges should not deny its effect by substituting their own notions of public
policy. 9 The logic of this approach is just as applicable to the recapitalization or
extinguishment of preferred arrears4" as it is to the modification of other shareholder "rights," though in this particular area, the old rule has been given up witb_
special reluctance because of the semblance of retrospective change 1 No provision
of the federal or state constitutions forbids giving full effect to such legislation. Thishas long been recognized in New York4 It is increasingly the prevailing view
elsewhere.43 Indeed, a survey of judicial history since Havender reveals no landmark decision reinvigorating the old doctrine of "vested rights."
" Medieval Poland required unanimous consent for the choice of a king. But in consequence, the
electors spent all their time maneuvering for decision, without opportunity to attend to the business of
the state.
"Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 IIl. 261, 85 N.E.2d 722 (i949); Anderson v. Cleveland-Cliffs.
Wo
Iron Co., 87 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio C.P. 1948), 18 U. CIN. L. REV. 539 (1949). See also Waterbury,
Corporatons-Dividends-Eliminationof Dividend Accumulation by Direct Charter Amendment, 48
MImH. L. REv. 657 (195o).
"lanes v. Washburn Co., 326 Mass. 356, 94 N.E.2d 479 (1950), 30 B.U.L. REV. 574 (1950), 37
VA. L. REv. 318 (1951); Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 87 A.2d 227 (1952).

"'Garzo v. Maid of the Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 516, 104 N.E.2d 882 (952); Liebschutz vSchaffer Stores Co., 276 App. Div. 1, 93 N.Y.S.2d 125 ( 4 th Dep't 1949), af'd, 279 App. Div. 96, so8"
N.Y.S.2d 476 ( 3 d Dep't 1951); Arstein v. Robert Reis & Co., 77 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. X948), aff'd,
273 App. Div. 963, 79 N.Y.S.2d 314 (ist Dep't 1948); McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54
N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Hinckley v. Schwarzchild & Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N.Y..
Supp. 357 (ist Dep't 1905). See also Anderson v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 295 N.Y.
343, 67 N.E.2d 573 (1946); Davison v. Parker, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E.2d 618
(1941).

"Metzger v. George Washington Memorial Park, Inc., 380 Pa. 350, iio A.2d 425 (1955); French
v. Cumberland Bank & Trust Co., 194 Va. 475, 74 S.E.2d 265 (1953); Donohue v. Heuser, 239 S.W.2d
238 (Ky. 1951); Sherman v. Pepin Pickling Co., 230 Minn. 87, 41 N.W.2d 571 (1950); Western
Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 26o, 85 N.E.2d 722 (1949); Franzblau v. Capital Securities Co., 2 N.J.
Super. 517, 64 A.2d 644 (Ch. 1949); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.2d 341
(1949); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Ch. 1943); Hubbard v. Jones
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This is not to say that shareholder interests have lost all protection under the

Constitution. They retain such protection as comparable types of property enjoy.
But it does mean that there is no constitutional requirement for unanimous assent
for changes of class shareholder rights. Assuming the reservation of a power to
amend, the assent of the statutory majority is sufficient and binding on all nonassenting members of the class, regardless of the times when the stock was issued
and the statute enacted. Since these statutes were enacted to keep the agencies of
business healthy and adaptable to changing business conditions, it is important that
the same rules apply uniformly to all corporations, without regard to the time of
their organization and financing. 4
The disappearance of "vested rights" in the sense of a requirement for unanimous
consent before any change of important right is even more conspicuous in the
pattern that has been followed by all new legislation in the last ten years. Beginning
in 1946, thirteen states have adopted complete new corporation codes or largely
amended their existing law. In every instance, these new provisions purport to
authorize any kind of change, whatever its nature or extent, when approved by a
specified proportion of the shareholders. In most instances, stockholders are protected against changes of a substantially adverse nature by requiring the assent of
two-thirds of the affected class, voting separately, even though not otherwise entitled
to vote at all by the terms of the charter. There is great merit in requiring that at
least two out of every three adversely affected stockholders must favor the change.
This high requirement will exert an influence on the formulation of the plan and,
when satisfied, provides a strong practical assurance of the will of the owners.
Where a two-thirds vote is required, none of the new statutes provides the alternative of a cash appraisal. Among the new statutes, that extraordinary remedy is confined to those that do not require a class vote or, if any, require no more than a
majority assent. 5
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 42 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Pa. 194'); Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills Co., 113
Va. 717, 75 S.E. 309 (19x2). And see HENRY W. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 648-50 (rcv. ed. 1946);
Gibson, supra note i9, at 603-i9; Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporationsfrom Vested Right
to Mirage, 57 HARv. L. REV. 894 (1944); Latty, Fairness-TheFocal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage
Elimination, 29 VA. L. REv. z, 51 (1942); Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate
Charters, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 723 (1927).
The states still applying the old doctrine are exceptional. E.g., Schaffner v. Standard Boiler & Plate
Iron Co., i5o Ohio St. 454, 83 N.E.2d 192 (1948); Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 79 Ohio App. 93, 72
N.E.2d 482 (1945), modified on appeal, 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E.2d 187 (1946); Clark v. Henrietta
Mills, 2.i9 N.C. 1, 12 S.E.2d 68z (1941); Patterson v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N.C. 7, 12 S.E.2d 686
(94i); Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 2r4 N.C. 8o6, 2oo S.E. 9o6 (1939).
"Thus, the Virginia Code Commission said: 'It is important in the public interest that the same
rules apply to present corporations and securities as to new ones and thus that the Act apply in full
force to corporations existing and securities outstanding at its effective date." Con CoMMrsIssI N o
VIRGINIA Fop REvisrON OF TE LAWS RELATING TO CORPORATIONS, REPORT

94

(1955).

""The cash-appraisal remedy is a substantial handicap to management. See, e.g., NEw YoRK BAR
Assocrm-oN CoMMITTEE oN COitpoa rsoN LAw, REPORT 75, 80 (1957). The protection it affords the shareholder is often largely formal, and it is generally thought "unsatisfactory." See Dodd, Fair and Equitable
Recapitalizations, 55 H~aw. L. REv. 780, 816 (1942); cf. Note, Interplay of Rights of Stockholders Dissenting from Sale of Corporate Assets, 58 COLXrM. L. REv. 251 (X958). But cf. Skoler, Some Observations of the Scope of Appraisal Statutes, 13 BUsINEss LAWYER 240, 245-53 (1958).
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The outlines of this new legislation are shown in the following table. The Model
Act referred to is that prepared by the Committee on Corporate Law of the American Bar Association (the latest revision being in 1957).-

TABLE D
Nxw LEGisLATIoN

State
Kentucky

Date

Nature

1946

Oklahoma

1947

"Any change in preferences, special rights or
powers" upon a two-thirds class vote, without
any alternative. Ky. REv. STAT. §271.445. (1955)
Specific enumeration of all known changes, upon
a majority vote of the affected class, with cash
appraisal right. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§1.153-57

Maryland

1951

Wisconsin

1951

Specific enumeration of all known changes, upon
a two-thirds vote, without a class vote unless so
provided by charter but with right of cash appraisal. MD. ANN. CODE. art. 23, §§10-11 (1951).
The Model Act (specific enumeration of all
known changes, upon a two-thirds class vote,
with no alternative). Wis. STAT. §§180.51-52
(1955).

Oregon

1953

The Model Act, as above.

(1951).

ORE.

REv.

STAT.

§§57.355-65 (Supp. 1955)
Any change in "preference, or ... rights", upon
a majority class vote, with no alternative. FLA.
STAT. §608.18 (1955).
The Model Act, as above, except the clause
authorizing the cancellation of rights to accrued,
but undeclared, dividends is omitted. D. C.
CODE ANN. §§29-921f-22 (Supp. 1956).
The Model Act, as above. TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT.
arts. 4.01-.03 (1956).
Specific enumeration of all known changes, upon
a majority class vote, with cash appraisal. N. C.

Florida

1953

District of Columbia

1954

Texas

1955

North Carolina

1955

Virginia

1956

§§55-99-101 (Supp. 1955).
The Model Act, as above. VA. CODE

North Dakota

1957

§§13.1-55-57 (Supp. 1956), as amened, Va. Acts
1958, c.564.
The Model Act, as above. N. D. Laws 1957,

Alaska

1957

Colorado

1958

GEN. STAT.

ANN.

c.102, §§54-56.
The Model Act, as above. Alaska Sess. Laws
1957, c.126, §§53-55.
The Model Act, as above. Colo. Laws 1958, S. B.
14 (effective January 1, 1959).

All these statutes confer the power of amendment in the broadest possible terms.
While in two instances, the words are general in nature, they are, nevertheless, unlimited. The others take pains to enumerate all familiar types of modifications of
class rights that had been reviewed by the courts, thus foreclosing any possibility of a
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restrictive interpretation. It is noteworthy that none confers or contemplates any
power of review, whether administrative or judicial, on grounds of fairness. This
-was for no want of example or precept. Examples are available, but unappealing.40
And precept was profuse, though unconvincingY7
This decade of legislation, in which about a quarter of the states rewrote their
corporation statutes deliberately to preclude review for "fairness," followed immediately upon a decade which had been largely occupied in enforcing a "fairness" test in
corporate rearrangements of wide diversification. Fairness in railroad reorganizations
-under section seventy-seven of the Bankruptcy Act or chapter fifteen had been litigated
-endlessly.4 Experience with industries under section 77B or chapter ten had been
.comparable. 49 Even the expert administrative agencies had found difficulties under
section eleven of the Public Utility Holding Company Act50 and under section five
,of the Interstate Commerce ActY1 While such may be the rocky road to follow
' Administrative review is available uniquely in California by the definition of "sale" in the Blue
Sky law. C.. CoRP'. CoDz § 250o9. An example of the uncertainties that result is afforded by the
pending litigation of Western Airlines with the California Commissioner over the charter amendment
approved by a 59% vote of its stockholders to eliminate cumulative voting. Western Airlines is a Dela-ware corporation; but in view of this litigation arising out of California law, the amendment has been
-withheld. See Seward, The Movement for Modernization of State Corporation Laws, Commercial
and Financial Chronicle, July 11, 1957. Judicial review is available uniquely in Nebraska, under a
statute permitting any adversely-affected stockholder to apply to any court of competent jurisdiction to
-enjoin amendments "on the grounds of fraud or unfairness," with the requirement that the court enjoin
-the amendments if the proponents "fail to show that, to a reasonable probability, they are fair, just, and
-equitable." NED. REv. STAT. § 21-1162 (X954). Court review is also available in England by statute
permitting any adversely-affected shareholder to apply to a court, which may disallow the amendment
"if satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that the variation would unfairly
prejudice the shareholders" of that class. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. 6, c. 38, § 72.
7 See, e.g., Latty, Exploration of Legislative Remedy for Prejudicial Changes in Senior Shares, 19
U. Cm. L. REV. 759 (1952); Walter, Fairness in State Court Recapitalization Plans-a Disappearing
Doctrine, 29 B.U.L. REv. 453 (1949); Note, 69 HAuv. L. REV. 538, 543 (1956). 'The more thoughtful
-commentators recognized that "fairness" is too vague and difficult to apply in practice. See Becht,
Alteration of Accrued Dividends, 49 MicH. L. REV. 363, 565, 588-92 (1951); Becht, Corporate Charter
Amendments, Issues of Prior Stock and the Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50 COLUM. L. Rzv. 90
(1950); Becht, Changes in the Interests of Classes of Stockholders by Corporate Charter Amendments,
.Reducing Capital and Altering Redemption, Liquidation and Sinking Fund Provisions, 36 CORNELL L.Q.
r (1950); Note, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 768 (1952).
"SE.g., Insurance Group Comm. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 329 U.S. 607 (947); RFC v. Denver
& R.G.W.R.R, 328 U.S. 495 (1946); Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St.P. & Pac. R.R.,
For a discussion of the
3r8 U.S. 523 (1943); Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (943).
difficulties involved in evaluating railroad assets in a reorganization, a process which must underlie any
attempt to ascertain the "fairness" of any proposed plan, see Wren, The Valuation of a Railroad in
Reorganization, 58 CoLTrm. L. REv. 316 (1958).
"'See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., 308 U.S. io6 (1939). The Securities and Exchange Commission is still redefining die
standards. See In the Matter of Geren River Steel Corp., Corp. Reorg. Release No. xo5, Jan. 24, 1957,
p. 21.

-

"OSee SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949); Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S.
624 (945).
"See Sehwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948). The difficulties in applying a test of
"fairness" to corporate readjustments do not result from the imprecision of that term alone. They
are inherent in the intrinsic vagueness of any standard, however defined, with which one attempts to
weigh complex economic conjectures. Thus, the same uncertainties have been met under § 2ob of the
Interstate Commerce Act, where the plan must be found to be "in the best interests" of each class.
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where creditors can not be satisfied or special public policies are to be enforced, the
states have chosen a different road for the modification of class shareholder rights in
the case of the ordinary solvent corporation. The reason has primarily been the
belief, characteristically American in nature, that it ought to be possible to consummate practical transactions without having to stop first to conclude exhaustive
examinations into matters that are largely indeterminable. Three contributing
reasons may be noted. As the rate of economic change has quickened and corporatons have grown in size, the practical pressures for completing a plan expeditiously
have increased. The same growth has been accompanied by a dispersal of stock
ownership that has tended to separate management from domination by a cohesive
group of stockholders. This has reduced the dangers of insider preference. Finally,
the question of fair treatment involves a balancing of different investment attributes
in the light of prospective future earnings, which is not pre-eminently adapted to
the judicial expertise.
The extent to which the decisions and statutes discussed above cover corporate
business in the United States can be judged from the following table identifying
the ten states whose corporations had the greatest combined assets. This table is
based on a study of the 6oo largest industrial, merchandising and utility companies
in the United States. It shows that of those covered in the study, 498 were in2
corporated in these ten states.
The modern view is, thus, securely established that a two-thirds vote of the
affected class will bind the minority, as under the Model Act.
II
THE ScoPE OF JuDICIAL

REvIw

TODAY

Though the old "vested rights" decisions were cast in terms of power, judges apparently were really troubled by the question of fairness of treatment. When they
denied the existence of the power of a corporation to effect a proposed change on
grounds that seemed technical, often they were motivated by the belief that the
plan was unfair and should not be allowed, usually for the reason that management
was apparently dominated by a cohesive majority group that was attempting to cut
down the rights of a senior class or a minority of the same class without sufficient
The Boston and Maine plan for the disposition of preferred arrears was first turned down by the Commission and then, on a more vigorous presentation, approved. Boston and Maine R.R. Securities
Modification, 282 I.C.C. 750 (1953). The Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad has not yet succeeded. Its
first plan was rejected by the Commission. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Securities Modification, 275
I.C.C. 499 (1950)- It then submitted a second plan on Dec. 24, 1952. I.C.C. Finance Docket No.
s8oo6. This plan was amended on Jan. 25, 1955, in an unsuccessful attempt to meet the Commission's
objections. The second plan was then withdrawn. (Order unreported.) A third proposal was then
filed on May 1, 1957, In the Matter of the Application of the Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., I.C.C.,
Finance Docket No. 1976o, and an examiner's report has recommended that it be approved with
modifications. The N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, X957, P. 39, col. 4-5.
" Compiled by James F. Spoerri from the supplement edition Fortune of July 1956, in JOINT
Cor thf. To STmy REvisIoN OF CoapoRATE LAws, INraum REPORT 61 (New York Legislative Document
No. 17, 1957).
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TABLE E
CoROpoRTE BusinEss
State
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

No. of Corporations

Assets (in millions)

202
85
45
45
36
29
13
18
11
14

$55,424
40,991
22,768
11,659
7,859
6,402
4,864
3,777
3,528
2,476

Delaware .................
New York .................
New Jersey ................
Pennsylvania ..............
Ohio ......................
Illinois ....................
California .................
Maryland .................
Indiana ...................
Virginia...................

compensation or necessity. There are some opinions, indeed, that expressly went
on grounds of fairness. r
But "fairness" is an elusive standard. Where the statutory power exists, there
is no clear and certain test by which the chancellor can allow its exercise for some
purposes and disallow its exercise for others. The quest for "fairness" also leads the
chancellor into new fields where he is normally not expert. It places on him the
heavy burden of solving complex economic problems in order to formulate a judgment as to the soundness, and hence the fairness, of the proposed amendment. The
efforts to apply a deliberate test of "fairness" were, thus, gradually abandoned.
They finally disappeared with the "vested rights" doctrine. It is now recognized
that where the legal power for a recapitalization exists, the question of fairness is
not one for judicial examination:
The fairness or unfairness of corporate action may not be considered where that
action is in exercise of a power conferred upon the corporation by the Act under which
it was organized. 54
.. . the minority shareholder may not obtain relief in equity where his claim is based
upon unfairness rather than fraud. 5
Does it follow that no judicial review is permissible?

By no means. Unfairness

"E.g., Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A.2d 200 (Ch. 1943), a/I'd per
curiam, 134 N.J. Eq. 359, 35 A.2d 894 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944). And see Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar
Co., 3134 N.J. Eq. 271, 35 A.2d 215 (Ch. 1944), a/I'd sub nom. Murphy v. Guantanamo Sugar Co.,
135 N.J. Eq. 506, 39 A.2d 431 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).

';'Franzblau v. Capital Securities Co., 2 N.J. Super. 517, 528, 64 A.2d 644, 649 (oh. 1949).
5 Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash.2d 286, 297, 242 P.2d 1025, x033 (1952).

See also Dratz v.

Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.2d 341 (i949); Liebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.2d 35I
(7th Cir. 1936); Katz v. R. Hoe & Co., 199 Misc. 459, X03 N.Y.S.2d io6 (Sup. Ct. 595o); Maddock
v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Ad. 255 (Ch. 1929); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F.
Supp. i98, 201 (D. Del. 1944), 146 F.2d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1944); Baker v. Standard Lime & Stonc

Co., 203 Md. 270, ioo A.2d 822 (1953); Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d X22
(195r); BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra note 43, at 656.
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is very different from fraud. Fairness raises a question of judgment, where opinions

may differ endlessly, and the average businessman is not particularly equipped to
know what someone else might conclude at a later date with further evidence. But
fraud raises a question of conscience, where the average businessman is likely to
recognize that something is shocking and ought to be illegal, whenever it might be
reviewed by a court and whatever might be the further evidence. Such a test

is sufficiently definite to be practical, though sufficiently elastic to evolve with
changing circumstances. It is in sharp contrast with the roving judgment contemplated by the "fairness" test in reorganization legislation.
Where fraud is alleged, all of the new corporation codes contemplate that the
courts shall have jurisdiction, on timely application, to prevent the consummation of
a plan. In some statutes, this is express. 6 In the Model Act and similar legislation,
it is equally presupposed.
Where the interests of so many people are involved and the securities are traded
on the exchanges, there is an unusually urgent need for prompt action on the part
of anyone seeking to prevent the accomplishment of a plan. In the case of mostlisted securities, a stockholder will have received notice some three or four weeks
before the meeting and should know that in the ordinary course, the amendment will
be presented for effectuation immediately upon the conclusion of the meeting. Once
the plan has been put into effect, it becomes virtually impossible to turn back the
clock withoujt hurting the innocent as well as the guilty. For this reason, the doctrines of laches and estoppel should be applied with especial strictness. Those who
have reason to object and know it but do not speak seasonably should not be heard
subsequently. Ordinarily, this should mean action before the issuance of the amendment.
What then is fraud? There is no definition in the statutes. That is left, and
rightly so, to the equity judges, who have always used it as a flexible means of
preventing a wrong of such nature as to shock the conscience. Whatever the
changing circumstances may be, the equitable doctrine of fraud will be available,
though it remains to be formulated by actual decisions as controversies take shape.
This necessary and unavoidable imprecision, however, makes it a dangerous weapon,
and one that judges should use with great restraint. In the past, the term has
acquired reasonably identifiable boundaries. When applied to determine the legality
of changes in corporations, it should be kept within these limits. A few things

would, thus, seem expectable.
Manifestly, "fraud" should not be used as a means of nullifying the recentlyenacted statutes. It cannot be found in a modification, as such, of a class shareholder's rights that is in terms permitted by the statute. To take an extreme case,
a total cancellation of accrued unpaid dividends on preferred stock is one of the
changes specifically authorized in the Model Act and most of the recent statutes. It
"' See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-125 (Supp. 1956), restricting all review of Corporation Com-

mission action to direct appeal, "except for fraud."
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should not be possible for the courts to hold such an amendment, in and of itself,
fraudulent, since it is not in their province to substitute their view of public policy
for the one adopted by the legislature. 7 An exception might well exist, as indicated
below, if the particular circumstances were such as to disqualify the vote as an
authentic expression of class assent. But it is to be remembered that however the
concept of fraud may evolve, it is still something different from unfairness. Since
the pattern of recent legislation deliberately withholds court review for unfairness,
the judges should be vigilant to see that they do not actually exercise such a jurisdiction under the name of "constructive fraud" or other vague metaphors of the
fraud idea.
Affirmatively, it can be said with some confidence that as judges are accustomed
to look with greatest favor on equality as a touchstone of equity, so inequality of
treatment among members of the same class is the plainest badge of fraud. As
long ago as i919, the Southern Pacific Company, upon the reorganization of an
indirect subsidiary, caused the accomplishment of a plan by which the minority
stockholders could obtain shares in the new company only upon paying an assessment of $71.4o per share, while the Southern Pacific was allotted all the stock in the
new company for an assessment of no more than $26 per share plus a guarantee in
respect to the new bonds and an underwriting commitment in respect to all the
shares. The court sustained a subsequent complaint by minority shareholders as
to the allocation of the new stock. It said that when a majority (here a single
company) exercises control, "it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority,""8

and thus concluded that59
... the minority may not be excluded from a fair participation in the fruits of the sale....
The wrong lay not in acquiring the [new] stock, but in refusing to make a pro rata
distribution on equal terms among the old . .. shareholders.
This principle applies equally where shareholders seek a preference before
creditors. ° It applies also to beneficial incidents of the stockholder interest, even
though not strictly a part of the assets held by the corporation, as where two pre-

ferred stockholders, the only ones to attack a reorganization plan, purported to appeal
for the common benefit of their class and then, after the expiration of the appeal
period, settled for a substantial payment. What the appellants received "in excess
of their own interest as stockholders was not payment for anything they owned,"

but rather for settlement of litigation affecting equally all other preferred stockholders, from which it follows that the "fruit properly belongs to all.""1 They were
compelled, therefore, to make a pro rata contribution to all the other holders of the
same class. For similar reasons, it has been held that preferential treatment for
certain stockholders to induce their assent to a merger would constitute fraud justi"Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor & Trustee,

302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
"s Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
:old. at 487-88, 492.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 3o6-i2 (i939).

.:Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1945).
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fying an injunction against the merger, unless the treatment were made available
equally to all 6
This fundamental principle of equal treatment for all members of the same
class is related to a further principle against duality of interest. The simplest case
is to suppose that the owner of all the common stock is also the owner of two-thirds
of the preferred and, thus, assents to an amendment canceling preferred arrears
without any compensation. Whatever he gives up in his capacity as a preferred

shareholder comes to him as the common shareholder-not only that, indeed, but
also what the other preferred shareholders lose as well. Here is a conflicting motive,
extrinsic and contrary to the expectable interests of the preferred as a separate class,
that, as anticipated in the reference above, invalidates the class vote as an authentic
expression of class choice and, thus, makes inoperative the prime safeguard afforded
by the statute.
3
It is plain that a director is a fiduciary for the corporation and its stockholders
Majority stockholders are not, by mere reason of their holdings, automatically trustees
and, indeed, ordinarily remain free to vote their shares in any way they may wish! 4
But they may be made to share the fiduciary responsibilities of directors where the
directors are put in office by them, especially if acting. as a cohesive group.P5 If so,
duality of interest, by one or the other, leads quickly to fraud.
A suggestive and arguable illustration is supplied in the attempt of the Seagrave Corporation to acquire a subsidiary from another corporation. There were
seven directors of Seagrave. Of these, four had been put in office by a small group
of controlling stockholders for whom the plan provided an option of selling their
shares to the dominant stockholder of the selling corporation at a premium of onethird above the current market. This preferential option was not available to the
Seagrave's minority shareholders. The other three directors were top management
officers, who were in danger of losing their positions under the present control, but
who were assured of continuation in office by the dominant stockholder of the selling

corporation, who was, through these arrangements, simultaneously acquiring control of Seagrave. This was, indeed, a cloudy picture.
On attack by a minority stockholder of Seagrave, a district court enjoined the
plan on the ground that each group of directors had a substantial personal interest of
conflicting nature which precluded an exercise of independent judgment on the
merits of the plan 6 An appeal by Seagrave was very nearly successful on the
ground that the proxy statement made a full disclosure of the preferential option
and also of the inclination of the new owners to continue top management. Agree" Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash.2d 286, 297, 242 P.2d 1O25, 1033 (1952).
"aPepper v. Litton, 3o8 U.S. 295, 3o6 (1939).
"'Baker v. Standard Limestone & Stone Co., 203 Md. 284, 285, i00 A.2d 822, 829 (1953).
"CLebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.2d 351, 353-54 ( 7 th Cit. 1936); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
306 (1939).

In close corporations, the personal relationships between stockholders may involve special

elements of trust and confidence, and in such cases, a fiduciary relation is easier to establish.
Duckworth, 249 F.ad 482 (D.C. Cir. r957).
" Mount v. Seagrave Corp., 112 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Ohio 1953).

Helms v.
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ing also that the economic fairness of the plan was not open to judicial examination
and that the terms of the plan were not so oppressive that they could be called
fraudulent in themselves, the court of appeals, nevertheless, affirmed on the ground
that the personal interests of the directors at stake "deprived the stockholders of
07
that impartial, unprejudiced action which the fiduciary relationship required. 1
Calling this "constructive fraud," the court affirmed the injunction.
This case emphasizes the statutory function of the directors in making the
initial proposal of the plan to the shareholders. That submission undoubtedly involves the responsibility of recommendation, even though the words of the Model
Act do not require anything except the adoption of a resolution "setting forth the
proposed amendment" for submission at a meeting of the shareholders.0 8 And some
states have spelled out this inferential responsibility of recommendation in their
statutes. Thus, Virginia requires that the resolution be one "setting forth the
proposed amendment, finding that it is in the best interest of the corporation and
"69
directing that it be submitted. ...
In the Seagrave case, however, since the only two elements of conflicting interest,
the premium and the employment, were clearly shown in the proxy statement, the
case is an extreme one and merits criticism. Other courts would have decided the
other way.70 As a general rule, that seems the right course, because the full disclosure gives a substantial minority of the stockholders the power to reject the plan.
There seems no public policy for denying the owners the right to assent, if they
choose to do so with full notice. With regard to the inequality of treatment, which
was the basic ground of the decision, the court, at most, could have conditioned its
injunction on refusal to open up the preferential offer in such a way as to make it
equally available to the minority. But, it should. be recognized that this is a jurisdiction to be sparingly exercised, since it means that the court is making a new
bargain in lieu of what the principals have accepted. With regard to the dual
interest of the three directors, which was a secondary ground for the decision, the
court's decision is shortsighted, in that it may make any action iinpossible in particular situations, and improvident, in that it pays no heed to the possible benefits
of the plan. The minority might well have been better off with the plan than without it, even though not quite so well off as the majority. They may not be benefited by setting the whole plan aside, even though a particular litigant might benefit
in a tactical sense. Salving the conscience of the court or vindicating the theoretical
correctness of a single shareholder's objection is not as important as protecting the
general interests of the shareholders, the corporation, and the public.
Where there is a conflicting interest of such substantial nature and effect as to
negate the statutory process of director recommendation and class assent, the appropriate remedy is to put the proponents on proof that the plan is fair. This is the
" Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 393 (6th Cir. 954).
MODEL BUSINEss CoRoPRAToN ACT § 54.
'VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-56 (Supp. 1956).
70 See Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash.2d 286, 242 P.2d io25 (x952).
08
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rule applied by some courts in similar situations where directors have other interest. 1 It has special applicability in cases where the plan itself involves a conflicting interest of directors or, more importantly, of shareholders. This has been
recognized :72
Plaintiffs invoke the settled rule of law that Hilton as a majority stockholder of Mayflower and the Hilton directors as its nominees occupy, in relation to the minority, a
fiduciary position in dealing with Mayflower's property. Since they stand on both sides
of the transaction, they bear the burden of establishing its entire fairness, and it must
pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
Such proof would normally follow the general pattern of the reorganization
cases. First, that there is some corporate need for the recapitalization and that the
particular plan is feasible. Second, that the treatment accorded the respective classes
is fair. This requires the court to weigh the investment attributes of the old stock
according to their probable realization in the light of reasonably foreseeable future
73
earnings, and hence to appraise "the current worth of [the] promise" or its "investment value.1 74 This is to be compared with the prospective economic or investment worth, similarly ascertained, of the differing attributes of the new securities
or other consideration proposed. No dollar figures are necessary as to the old and
the new.N7 Rather, a judgment conclusion is contemplated to the general effect that
the new treatment will represent "the equitable equivalent" 76 of the old or its
"economic equivalent."7 7 This is not to be ascertained on a spot-cash basis, but on
the basis of the prospective future that has such a degree of likelihood within such
an expectable period of time as normally to merit recognition by a reasonable investor. In all this field, there are legal standards to apply, but the material and the
economic in nature.
measures for weighing it are financial and
The occasions for judicial review of the elements of fraud that have been so fat
mentioned may now be summarized in classical, though necessarily general, words
of the Supreme Court. It said that judicial review begins where legal power is
exceeded or "a fraudulent transaction" is theatened and, thus, by way of illustration:'7

where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own interest,
in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other share...

holders; ...

Or where the majority of the shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally
pursuing a course in the name of the corporation, which is in violation of the rights of
the other shareholders, and which can only be restrained by the aid of a court of equity.

"E.g., Fountain v. Oreck's, Inc.,
7
"

245 Minn. 202; 7r N.W.2d 646 (x955).
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 314, 93 A.2d 1O7, iro,
Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. iA, 199 (1948).

119
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the Matter of Green River Steel Corp., Corp. Reorg. Release No. io5, Jan. 24, 1957, P. 21.
"'Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St.P. & Pac. R. Co., 328 U.S. 523, 565-66 (r943).
"Ibid.
"Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 200 (1948).
"Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 117 (i957), quoting from Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460
(88s).
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The next element that will be given greatest weight in shifting a question of fraud
is the sufficiency and fullness of the information given to stockholders. As already
indicated, it would be too extreme to say that disclosure precludes the possibility of
fraud. The sole owner of all the common stock and two-thirds of the preferred
voting to cancel without compensation all preferred arrears for his own benefit
should be held fraudulent, however boldly his purpose be preclaimed in a proxy
statement. But in all cases of alleged fraud, there can be no doubt that disclosure
is the strongest antiseptic. The more fully the owners are informed as to the
meaning and consequences of their choice, the more meaningful is their vote as an
authentic expression of ownership preference and, thus, the fuller the satisfaction
of the statutory policy. At the same time, the fuller is the protection that will be
accorded management. The basic importance of adequate information is recognized
in the stock exchanges :
Shareowners must be assured of adequate and timely information on which to base their
vote-and in a larger sense-on which to base their investment decisions.
Where no proxy statement is required by the governing statute, the mere requirement of notice of the meeting is not to be read so broadly as to have the
same effect. It means notice in the classical sense, and no more. But this means only
that a meeting will not be held invalid for lack of notice where the meager notice
of dassical proportions has been given. If any substantial question of fraud arises,
a wholly different standard comes into play at once, and an adequate exposition of
the nature and effect of the change may well be required not to satisfy the statutory
standard, but to repel the charge of fraud.
Turning now from interpretation to policy, it is desirable that legislation go on
further to require this same degree of information from the business managers in
any proposal for recapitalization. The affairs of corporations have become so technical and so remote from the usual shareholder that there is increasing need for
proxy statements that dearly reveal the substance of the proposal. Where there is
no such requirement, one should be supplied. Suitable information is required by
the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to all securities listed on a
national securities exchange. s Its administration of that law, as of the Securities
Act of 1933,s1 has undoubtedly been a great national benefit. But there are many
other corporations of general investment interest that have no securities listed on
a national securities exchange and, thus, are not subject to the Proxy Regulation.
Bills have been pending unsuccessfully in the Congress since 1949 to extend the
proxy power of the Securities and Exchange Commission over unlisted securities.
If confined to corporations of sufficient size, this is a meritorious proposal that
79 Funston, supra note 33, at 4.

"Securities Exchange Act § 14, 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n
X-i 4 .
81 48 STAT. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1952).

(1952);
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should be enacted. The latest bill, as introduced by Senator Fulbright,s2 would
have applied to every issuer with total assets exceeding $2,oooooo, where its equity
securities are held of record by more than 750 persons. The studies of the Securities
and Exchange Commission indicate that in this form, the bill would have applied
s
to approximately i,2oo corporations with assets aggregating $35,oooooooooY As
reported out by the Committee, the bill is confined to corporations with at least
$io,ooo,ooo of assets and i,ooo shareholders. As so amended, the bill would reach
approximately 6oo unlisted companies and assure all their stockholders of the substantial, pertinent, and timely information that has resulted from the Commission's
healthy administration of section fourteen of the Securities Exchange Act" with
respect to listed companies. There can be no doubt that when a corporation reaches
this size and involves this many people, it becomes a matter of general consequence,
rather than of a purely local interest. It is also clear that with the increasing importance given class voting in modifications of class shareholder rights, adequate
information on the nature and effect of the plan grows in public importance. The
requirements of the Proxy Regulation are enforceable by judicial review and injunction before the meeting8 5
A more extreme proposal has also been under consideration by the Securities
and Exchange Commission involving the repeal of its Rule 133. Since the original
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, it has been generally understood that modifications of shareholder rights through voting procedures sanctioned by state statute,
like amendments and mergers, were not "sales" within the terms of the Act. This
basic conclusion as to the interrelation of federal and state legislation has not had
official standing in proportion to its importance. Though covering the field of
Securities and Exchange Commission responsibilities, it was originally embodied
only in an instruction to Form E, applicable to issues of securities in certain forms
of reorganization. This was applied in most situations, however, though not with
absolute uniformity. When Form E was repealed, the rule was not recorded anywhere and remained only as an unwritten tradition that was respected in the administration of the 1933 Act. In the course of the admirable revisions recently made
by the Commission to systematize all its rules and put of record all traditional
practices, Rule 133 was adopted as a precise and official statement of this practice.
s. 1168, 85 th Cong., ist Sess. (1957), introduced Feb. II, 1957. See also, Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency of the Senate on S. 594, S. ZZ68, and S. 16ol,
85th Cong., ist Sess. (1957); SEC, Report On S. 2054 to the Committee on Banking and Currency of
the Senate, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. (x956); SEC, Supplementary Report on S. 2o54 to the Committee on
Banking and Currency of the Senate, 85 th Cong., ist Sess. (1957); Meeker, Current Trends in the
Federal Securities Laws, 12 THE RFcoRD 347, 360 (1957); Meeker, Current Proposals to Amend the
a

2

Federal Securities Laws, 13 BUSINEss LAWYER 379, 386-87 (1958).
"' Testimony of J. Sinclair Armstrong on May 2o, 1957, Hearings, supra note 82, at 10-37.
at48 STAr. 895 (934), I5 U.S.C. § 78 n (1952).
1
" SEC v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), afid, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. i956); SEC v.
Okin, 58 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); SEC v. O'Hara Re-Election Comm., 28 F. Supp. 523 (D.
Cf. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1946); modified on other
Mass. 1939).
grounds, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948). But cf. Howard v. Furst,
140 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).

-304

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

The recent proposal for its early repeal is primarily designed to make the registration provisions of the 1933 Act applicable to mergers and amendments, since the
Commission feels that secondary distributions have occurred in connection with
some mergers contrary to the registration policies of the Act. But the proposed
remedy is far wider than the evil. It would give most recapitalizations the legal
status of sales, even though no new investment is to be made by the shareholder.
Such widespread opposition developed,86 that the Commission has deferred any
formal action on Rule 133 pending further study and has announced that it would
deal with distributions that appear to violate the registration policies of the Act on
87
a case-by-case basis
III
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When recapitalizations are needed, management plays a crucial role in crystallizing

the will of the owners. As steward for the absentee owners, it is for management
to formulate -a plan. This usually requires negotiation with underwriters, or institutional purchasers, or other corporations that may be included in a unification. The
initial choice of approach, differently affecting the interests of shareholders, is largely
'irrevocable once made, because a negotiation, however fluid, seldom flows backward.
'At each stige of the formulation of the plan, new responsibilities for fair treatment of
all interests resf on 'management as a result of the semifinal effect of shareholder
choice ufidei modern legislation. New responsibilities for full and fair disclosure
also result directly from this same circumstance, for the vote of the owners is meaningful as an expression of their real desire only if they are adequately informed.
There are mnassive sanctions to enforce these new responsibilities, though for the
-most part; they are beyond the process of a court and not utilizable in ordinary
litigation. True enough, at the technical level, disclosure is the most powerful
defense against a claim of fraud. Many things that would be fraudulent if unsaid
are not when explained, and the informed choice of a statutory majority will bind
all conclusively. The things that would remain fraudulent even though fully exs See SEC, REPORT oF PROCEEDINGS ON PROPOSED REVIsION OF RULE 133 UNDER inM SECUREnES Aar
OF 1933 app. 9, at IX-I2, 17-20, 44, 47, 93, X20 (1957).
"7Securities Act Release No. 3761, March xg, 1957; Demmler, Developments in Federal Regulation

Securities, 12 BUSINEss LAWYER 470, 476 (1957). Where the new securities are acquired with a view
to distribution, the Commission has asserted that the exemption is unavailable. Securities Act Release
No. 3846, Oct. 1o, 1957, although it may be observed that this presupposes a "purchase" from the
issuer, despite the fact that by Rule 133 there has been no "sale." See Orrick, Some Interpretative Problems Respecting the Registration Requirements under the Securities Act, 13 BUSINEss LAWYER 369 (z958).
There is an important difference where the securityholder is already invested in the venture. Thus,
the British Companies Act, 1948, II and 12 GEo. 6, C. 38, §38, specifying the contents of a prospectus,
has no application to a pro rata offering of new shares to existing shareholders. Cole, Morley, and
Scott, Corporate Financing in Great Britain, 12 BusINEss LAWYER 324, 356-59 (1957).
In the
case of a .reclassification, not only has the shareholder already invested, but he is also not asked to
supply additional capital, though admittedly his rights are being changed in substance and the proxy
requirements are, therefore, particularly salutary. For arguments favoring repeal of Rule 133, see Sargent,
A Review of the No-Sale Theory of Rule 533, 13 BUSINEss LAWYER 78 (957); for arguments opposing,
see Throop, In Defense of Rnle Y33, 13 BUsINEss LAWYER 389 (i958).
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plained are very few and exceptional. So also, fairness in the substance of the plan
has an eventual relation to reviewability: when it passes the point of a difference of
judgment and becomes shocking to the conscience of the chancellor, it is at the door
of fraud. But the principal sanctions lie further on.
At a deeper level, management impairs its standing with the shareholders when
it proposes an unfair plan or proposes any plan without adequately disclosing its
nature and effect. Either course is a perilous development for all concerned. As for
the stockholders, since they must look to management for the direction of operations
and the development of any necessary recapitalization plans, they must either sell
their stock, or go to the trouble of protesting, or take steps to throw management
out of office. As for management, the loss of shareholder trust and confidence
terminates their satisfaction in supervising the corporate affairs and, at a further
degree, may terminate their job as well. These consequences are not automatic.
But they are likely. And some of the largest oaks fall in unexpected winds. When
stockholders are restless and many shares are in temporary hands, any one who
knocks loudly on the door may find himself in.
Still more fundmental is the sanction imposed by society itself. Corporations
are allowed to manage their own business only if, by and large, they manage it well.
They are too large and too important to have their way on any other terms. The
rule that a two-thirds assent binds the whole class has come into being as the
healthy and practical rule for the modern corporation. It deserves to prevail and
to have the fidelity of management that will maintain it. But should abuses become
prevalent, the rule will be changed. And unless the corporation continues to do a
better job than government could, society will interpose to protect its essential interests.
This is not mere theorization on the familiar theme of power entailing responsibility. 'It represents the sensitive insight and governing motive of leading corporate
managements. This was well illustrated at the latest annual meeting of Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey. Here is the same company, it will be remembered, that
once had pioneering days of its own and was accused of frontier manners at that
time, was subsequently disintegrated under the Sherman Act,88 and is now multiplied
beyond any dream and one of our best citizens. First, as to the power of this great
corporation, which goes beyond physical possessions, the chairman said :8"
. . . Jersey is a leading example of democratic enterprise.

It strengthens the American

way at home and provides an example of its benefits to our friends abroad. And because
energy is an essential to defense, the company is an integral part of the shield that
guards all free men from tyranny.
Then as to the responsibilities that flow from this position, the chairman said:90
Jersey feels a responsibility and has a determination to maintain scientific and technical
"8Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
"9STANDARD

00 Ibid.

OIL COMPANY OF NEw JERSEY, 75TH ANNUAL MEETING

7 (x957).
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leadership; to prove itself a good citizen; to establish sound human relations. It believes
it must live by principles of ethics and morality which form the basic rules of society;
and do its part in establishing those rules of conduct in its business relations throughout
the world.
Applying this philosophy to operations, the president said :"
... [N]o commercial organization, particularly one of Jersey's size, can exist without
creating certain social influences and, thereby, acquiring responsibilities beyond those of
a purely business nature. These responsibilities will certainly grow in the future, as
Jersey's normal growth continues ....
Applying this to the particulars, the president gave special emphasis to the 156,ooo
employees and concluded:."
In addition, Jersey has civic responsibilities to the various communities where its
affiliates operate, financial responsibilities to the educational institutions from which it
draws many of its key employees, and-under many categories-responsibilities to governments.
With regard to the latter, Jersey's stature entitles it to add that these include "the
responsibility to help and to participate in the development of friendly foreign
nations. 9' 3 It has, indeed, more earthly power than many formal sovereignties that
sit in the United Nations.
This epitomizes the best thinking in contemporary corporate management. In
this new world, the feudal "diversities" are no longer meaningful. The class shareholder rights are not fixed, but relative, and it is better in the public interest that
this be so. But, without regard to the technical processes of the courts and looking
to broader social necessities that are translated into legislation and judicial process
whenever necessary, management has new responsibilities in consequence. Most
directly these are to the shareholders as analyzed above. But that is not all. With
great new size and power, there also come great new responsibilities toward all the
groups who are affected by the corporate undertaking. Thus, in a very real sense,
management bears a share of the responsibility for maintaining that miracle of a
dynamic, expanding, and socially-respected economy that supports the American way
of life.
8

Id. at 14.
1d. at 14.

"2 Id. at 15.

